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THE EMPLOYER'S DUTY OF NEUTRALITY IN THE
RIVAL UNION SITUATION: ADMINISTRATIVE AND
JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE MIDWEST PIPING
DOCTRINE
When confronted with the clash of rival union campaigns, the Board
and the courts can effectuate the basic policies of the national labor acts
only by formulating corollaries to the general rules defining employer duties.
An employer must refrain from interfering with the employees' exercise
of their rights under section 71 and must not "dominate or interfere with
the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute
. . . support to it . .. ." 2 Employees attempting to choose between
competing unions are peculiarly susceptible to the influence of their em-
ployer's preference, whether subtly or overtly expressed. In response to
this threat to employee free choice, the Board has created the Midwest
Piping doctrine.
I. THE MIDWEST PIPING DOCTRINE
In Midwest Piping & Supply Co.,3 the Steelworkers and Steamfitters
unions, both claiming to represent a majority of the employees, filed repre-
sentation petitions with the Board and vigorously campaigned in the plant.
The Steamfitters presented signature cards 4 to substantiate its claim to
majority status, and demanded employer recognition.5 The company there-
upon recognized the Steamfitters and signed a closed shop agreement6
1 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (1), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1958). Section 7 reads:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
National Labor Relations Act § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1958).
2 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (2), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1958).
3 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945).
4These cards state that the undersigned employee desires the named union to
represent him in collective bargaining with the employer.
5 It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain with a
majority union. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (5), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1958).
6A closed shop agreement, lawful at that time, provides that the employer will
hire only union members.
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pursuant to which it discharged two men loyal to the rival Steelworkers for
refusing to join the Steamfitters. The Steelworkers filed an unfair labor
practice charge alleging interference with employees' section 7 rights and
discrimination against employees to discourage union activities. 7 The
Board held that since the employer knew 8 that "a real question concern-
ing the representation of the employees" 9 existed, its recognition of the
Steamfitters had interfered with the exercise of the employees' section 7
right to choose their own collective bargaining agent. The Board deter-
mined that it was empowered to decide the representation question, rejected
signature cards as reliable indicators of employee preference,") and found
that a real question concerning representation still existed. It ruled that
when a real question of representation exists, an employer must remain
neutral until the Board settles that question through its election machinery.
Administration of this rule of employer neutrality has occasioned two
serious problems: whether it is applicable to an incumbent union situation,
and whether any evidence other than a Board election can be relied upon to
negate the existence of a real question of representation. Employer recog-
nition of one of two rival unions may substantially influence the employees'
choice of a bargaining representative by according the recognized union
"unwarranted prestige and advantage" '1 and opportunity to ensure con-
tinued support through a union security agreement. On the other hand,
during the period of employer neutrality required by the Midwest Piping
doctrine, the employees' right to collective representation is necessarily
curtailed, and the danger of disruptive strikes is correlatively increased.
7In violation of sections 8(1) and 8(3), the forerunners of sections 8(a) (1)
and 8(a) (3). See notes 1 & 2 supra. Filing these charges automatically postpones
the election until the charges are settled. International Hod Carriers, Local 840,
Supplemental Decision and Order, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1167 (1962).
8 Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1070 (1945). The Board's
phrase-"a real question concerning representation'--is an embellishment of the statu-
tory language, "a question of representation," in the National Labor Relations Act
§ 9(c)(1), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1958). See
also Sun Oil Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 833, 834 (1950); International Harvester Co., 87
N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1949) ("valid question as to . . .representation').
9 [The] record shows that both the Steamfitters and the Steelworkers had
vigorously campaigned in the plant, had apprised the respondent of their
conflicting majority representation claims, and had filed with the Board
conflicting petitions, which are still pending, alleging the existence of a ques-
tion concerning the representation of the employees covered by the agreement.
63 N.L.R.B. at 1070.
10 Respondent relied on signed membership cards as proof of the Steam-
fitters' claim of majority status. Under the circumstances, we do not regard
such proof as conclusive. Among other things, it is well known that member-
ship cards obtained during the heat of rival organizing campaigns like those
of the respondent's plants, do not necessarily reflect the ultimate choice of a
bargaining representative; indeed, the extent of dual membership among the
employees during periods of intense organizing activity is an important un-
known factor affecting a determination of majority status, which can best
be resolved by a secret ballot among the employees.
Id. at 1070 n.13.
11 See 10 NLRB ANN. REP. 39 (1945); cf. William D. Gibson Co., 110 N.L.R.B.
660, 665 (1954) (Member Rodgers, dissenting).
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A. When There Is No Incumbent Union
1. The "Unwarranted Prestige" Factor
The Midwest Piping rule eliminates the possibility that employer
recognition will bestow "unwarranted prestige" 12 on one rival union by
demonstrating its ability to communicate employee demands to the em-
ployer. To the employees the unrecognized competitor is an unknown
quantity whose election the employer had indicated it might not favor; with
election of the recognized union, collective bargaining should proceed more
smoothly with considerably less risk of strike and resultant loss of employee
income. The recognized union also gains the psychological prestige of a
"winner," having been temporarily successful in attaining bargaining status.
Thus, were the employer permitted to recognize one union, it could exert
considerable pressure on its employees to choose that union as their bar-
gaining agent although the unrecognized rival might be the better repre-
sentative. Indeed, the employer may have intended to recognize the union
that would be less demanding.
2. The Effect of a Union Shop Agreement
In A. 0. Smith Corp.,13 the employer recognized one of two competing
unions on the basis of a majority claim and tender of signature cards, and
entered into an agreement containing a union shop provision that required
all employees in the unit to join the recognized union within thirty days of
commencing employment. The Board held the employer's recognition un-
lawful because of the adverse effect of the union security clause on em-
ployee free choice.14 The union shop agreement does not automatically
eliminate the rival union since under the first proviso to 8(a) (3) the recog-
nized union cannot legally request the discharge of employees for failing
to join it, but only for failing to pay its dues or initiation fees; thus the
agreement creates only an agency-type shop 15 rather than a "union shop." 16
Nevertheless, its impact on employee free choice may be considerable.
Should the workers select the rival union, they would forfeit the initiation
fees and dues already contributed to the recognized union. Of course, the
1 Ibid.; Scherrer and Davisson Logging Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1587, 1589 (1958).
13 122 N.L.R.B. 321 (1958).
14 Compare Halben Chemical Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 872, modified and enforced, 279
F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1960).
15 The agency shop is a union security device which requires all employees in
the unit to pay dues to the representative union although no employee must join that
union as a condition of employment.
16Contrary to appearances, section 8(a) (3) does not permit the enforcement
of a union shop. Under this section it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
to discriminate "in regard to hire or tenure of employment" to discourage union
membership. But the employer can agree "to require as a condition of employment
membership [in the union] . . . on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning
of such employment . . . Provided further, That no employer shall justify any dis-
crimination against an employee [italics in original] . . . (B) if he has reasonable
grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other
than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership . .. .
(Emphasis added.) National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (3), 49 Stat. 452 (1935),
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magnitude of this influence depends on the amount of the fees and dues
involved. However, because an employee is acutely concerned with any
reduction of his take-home pay, the need to eliminate this employer op-
portunity for pressure provides an additional justification for the Midwest
Piping doctrine. Moreover, an employee might be unaware of the sig-
nificance of the 8(a) (3) proviso and therefore believe that he could be
discharged by his employer for refusing to join the recognized union. An
experienced rival union will explain to the employees the full effect of
8(a) (3); nevertheless, employees may well not be sufficiently convinced
to support the rival union openly. This possibility heightens the significance
of the union security clause in the no-incumbent-union context; its exist-
ence, however, is not prerequisite to application of the Midwest Piping
doctrine.
3. The "Unwarranted Advantage" 17 Factor
Although a union security clause may thus significantly impair em-
ployee free choice, its potential effect is not a constant factor underlying
the Midwest Piping doctrine, for such a clause is not included in every
contract. The prestige consideration is always present to a limited extent,
but its impact is difficult to estimate precisely. A more weighty factor than
either of these, and the basic premise of the Midwest Piping doctrine, is
the substantial impact on employee free choice of an employer's offer of
benefits during bargaining with the recognized rival. Employees realize
that if the recognized union is elected, benefits already agreed to Is will be
retained, whereas, should the rival union win, those benefits might be lost.
Of course, the rival will contend that, as bargaining agent, it can better
the offered terms, and the employer might have recognized the other union
to avoid this very possibility; but the "bird-in-the-hand" idea will normally
be a compelling incentive to elect the recognized union. Thus, recognition
would afford one union a significant advantage over its rival and enable the
employer to exercise a powerful influence over its employees' choice of a
bargaining representative.
4. The Need for Industrial Stability
But does the requirement of employer neutrality undermine Congress'
fundamental objective of promoting stability in industrial relations? 19 The
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1958). In Union Starch & Refining Co., 87
N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), the Board held that under 8(a) (3) (B), an employer can
discharge employees, regardless of a union shop agreement, only for failing to tender
the initiation fees and dues, and ordered the reinstatement of two employees who
had tendered their initiation fees and dues but had been discharged by the employer
for refusing to attend union meetings.
17 10 NLRB ANN. REP. 39 (1945).
18 The contract bar rule would be suspended as to any such agreement in order
to permit employee choice between the two unions. William D. Gibson Co., 110
N.L.R.B. 660, 662 (1954) (incumbent union situation) ; Deluxe Metal Furniture Co.,
121 N.L.R.B. 995, 999 n.6 (1958). The same reasoning would necessarily apply here.
19 For a discussion of congressional policy, see S. RFaP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1935) ; H.R. REP. Nos. 969, 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935) ; H.R. REP.
No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935); Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB,
338 U.S. 355, 362 (1949).
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Midwest Piping rule provides that during the period between the emergence
of a real question concerning representation and the election, s2 the em-
ployees cannot be represented by any union and accordingly cannot be pro-
tected or benefited by a collective bargaining agreement. However, the
vast majority of election cases are disposed of quite expeditiously; only a
very few will encounter considerable delay.21 And whatever temporary
frustration of "industrial stability" results 22 is outbalanced by the necessity
of effectuating the section 7 guarantee of employee free choice.p In a larger
sense, industrial stability can be promoted only when a designated bargain-
ing agent is truly representative of the employees in a given unit; thus,
employee free choice, rather than being inconsistent with industrial stability,
is essential to the realization of that objective.2 4 And when there is no
incumbent union, the employees' free choice of bargaining representative
can be substantially vitiated by employer recognition of one of two rival
unions, even though the employer acts in complete good faith. Therefore,
the enumerated factors which may exert undue influence on employee free
choice require employer neutrality in the no-incumbent-union situation.
B. The Incumbent Union Situation
In William D. Gibson Co., 2 5 in order to promote industrial stability,
the Board had created an exception to the Midwest Piping doctrine when
2 0 When objections to the election preclude certification of the victorious union,
the Board has held that a real question continues until the objections are settled and
the union is certified or a new election is ordered and held. Lenscraft Optical Corp.,
128 N.L.R.B. 836 (1960); National Container Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 1544 (1953),
enforced, 211 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1954); Stewart-Warner Corp., 94 N.L.R.B. 607
(1951), enforcement denied, 194 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1952). But cf. Ensher, Alexander
& Barsoom, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 1443 (1947).
2 1 In 837o of all election cases, no objections are filed and the election is conducted
in approximately 29 days after filing of the petition. In 91% of the cases in which
objections are filed, the election will not be delayed much more than two months. In
the very few cases appealed to the Board, the election will usually be conducted
within six months after filing of the petition. Further, although the filing of an
unfair labor practice charge during the campaign postpones the election at least until
the charge is settled, in 84% of these cases, charges are disposed of without formal
complaint in about 30 days; of the complaints issued, about 807 are finally settled
in about six months. See Letters from Stephan Gordon, Associate General Counsel
NLRB, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, March 5, Feb. 20, 1963;
Rothman, Recent Developments in the Law and Practice in the Office of the General
Counsel, NLRB, Address to the Southwest Conference, Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs, Aug 7, 1961, pp. 4-5.
22 "[The Midwest Piping doctrine,] necessary though it is to protect freedom of
choice in certain situations, can easily operate in derogation of the practice of con-
tinuous collective bargaining ...... Ensher, Alexander & Barsoom, Inc., 74 N.L.
R.B. 1443, 1445 (1947).
2 3 Cf. International Harvester Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125-26 (1949).
24 See St. Louis Independent Packing Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 700, 705 (7th Cir.
1961). The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
45 (1937) stated: "The theory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation
with accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace
and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does
not attempt to compel." The Court also pointed out that "collective action would
be a mockery if representation were made futile by interference with freedom of
choice." Id. at 34.
25 110 N.L.RtB. 660 (1954).
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one of the competing unions was an incumbent.2 6 In 1958, in Shea
Chemical Corp.,2 7 the Board, without explanation, specifically overruled 
2 8
this exception and held that an employer must stop bargaining collectively
with an incumbent once a real question of representation arises. This rule
can be evaluated by determining to what extent the considerations that
prevailed in the no-incumbent situation are applicable when union repre-
sentation predates the rivalry.
1. The Unwarranted Prestige Factor
In contrast to its substantial impact on employee free choice in the
no-incumbent situation, the prestige factor is insignificant when the em-
ployer continues to bargain with the incumbent after a rival union campaign
raises a question concerning representation, since usually the incumbent has
already been bargaining with the employer for at least a year.29 Employees
will inevitably be influenced by the results of the union's past bargaining
effort; its demonstrated ability to gain bargaining status is no longer im-
portant to their choice. The psychological factor of "voting for a winner"
is also insubstantial in the incumbent situation, since any additional prestige
the incumbent might gain by continuing as bargaining representative for
a few more months cannot revive or equal the initial psychological boost
following recognition. On the other hand, application of the rule to restrain
the statutory representative from negotiating with the employer deprives
the incumbent of a certain amount of legitimate prestige and in addition
quite probably casts unwarranted aspersion upon the "ex-incumbent" that
is no longer welcome at the employer's bargaining table.
26 William D. Gibson Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 660, 662 (1954) (Member Rodgers dis-
sented, id. at 663). The Steelworkers Union was representing Gibson's employees under
an effective collective bargaining agreement. A month before the Machinists Union
organized, and before the old contract with Gibson had expired, Gibson negotiated
a new contract with the Steelworkers that was left unsigned until "big steel" settled
the wage issue. The Machinists filed a timely representation petition on July 25;
on July 28, Gibson and the Steelworkers signed the new agreement. On July 30,
Gibson received a copy of the Machinists' representation petition but refused to cease
recognizing the Steelworkers, or to terminate enforcement of the union shop clause
in the new Steelworkers contract. The Machinists then filed unfair labor practice
charges under 8(a) (1), (2), (3), and (5).
27 121 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1958). Shea presented substantially the same situation as
Gibson. On January 29, the Oil Workers filed a representation petition with the
Board; on February 18, Shea signed a new tvo-year collective bargaining agreement
with the Mine Workers, and the Oil Workers filed unfair labor practice charges
under 8(a) (1), (2), (3), and (5). See also North Elec. Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 675
(1960), enforcement denied, 296 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1961) (following Shea).28 Although Shea presented a much stronger case for extending the Midwest
Piping rule to the incumbent situation, the Board specifically overruled Gibson, 121
N.L.R.B. at 1024, rather than limit it to a situation in which the essential agreement
had been negotiated before the representation petition was filed, and was signed before
the employer had received a copy of the petition. The trial examiner found these
facts controlling in Gibson, although the Gibson Board specifically reserved ruling
on this distinction. William D. Gibson Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 660, 661 n.4, 677 (1954).
Further, the Shea Board, 121 N.L.R.B. at 1028, chose not to accept the trial examiner's
attempt to distinguish Shea from Gibson, in which no bargaining had actually begun,
by limiting Gibson to a situation in which a real incumbent was already negotiating
an agreement at the time of the rival claim. Id. at 1038 (intermediate report).2 9 Ray Brooks, 98 N.L.R.B. 976 (1952), enforced, 204 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1953),
aff'd, 348 U.S. 96 (1954), established a one-year certification bar rule which guaran-
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2. The Effect of a Union Security Agreement
When one of the rival unions is an incumbent, the potential effect of a
union security clause on the employees' free choice is minimal since the
employees already have been paying dues to the incumbent union through-
out the existing contract term. Regardless of whether the employer must
cease recognizing the incumbent, if the employees elect the rival union, they
will lose their equity in dues paid 30 and be required to tender initiation fees
to the rival. After having paid dues to the incumbent for two or more
years,3 1 an employee is not apt to be much influenced by the possibility
of losing his equity in the relatively few dues payments required during the
pre-election period. Even if the filing of unfair practice charges or objec-
tions stays the election or certification for a fairly extended period,3 2 an
employee, once dissatisfied with the incumbent during the normal two-year
contract term, would almost certainly not be induced to change his mind 3
after another six months or year of the same caliber of representation be-
cause of this equity in dues payments.3 4 Further, since dues are very
often deducted from employee paychecks,3 5 continuation of the checkoff
until resolution of the representation question will exert little influence on
employee free choice compared to the initial impact of dues payments to a
newly recognized union in the no-incumbent situation. On the other hand,
an employee uninformed of the limiting effect of the 8(a) (3) proviso might
fear that he could be expelled from his present union and lawfully dis-
charged by his employer for supporting the rival union. 6  This potential
influence on employee free choice makes the impact of the union shop agree-
ment of some importance in the incumbent situation.
tees a certified union uninterrupted bargaining rights for one full year from its certifi-
cation.
When an employer recognizes a union on demand without recourse to Board
election, a rival union demand shortly after this recognition but before a contract
has been signed would raise a real question of representation since no certification
or contract bar would be involved. When the "incumbent!' union has been bargaining
for a very short time, to allow it to continue its bargaining effort would bestow
prestige to almost the same extent as in a no-incumbent situation. See text accom-
panying note 12 supra. When it has been bargaining for a fairly extended period,
the prestige factor approximates that of the true incumbent situation.30 Theoretically, their equity equals the difference between the amount of dues
paid and the benefits they have already received. In practice, since this benefit is
difficult to estimate even upon extended reflection, it seems unlikely that this factor
would much influence employee preference.
3lIn expanding the contract bar to three years, the Board said: "Perhaps of
greatest significance, we have also been persuaded . . . by the continuing trend
before and after 1958 toward agreements of more than two years' duration." General
Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. No. 111, at 6, 51 L.R.R.M. 1444, 1446 (1962), 1962
CCH N .L.R.B. 11782, at 18357.
32 See note 21 supra.
33 Either at the postponed election or at a later election should the first be set
aside.
34 See note 30 supra.35 "In 1960 a survey of 400 representative contracts by the Bureau of National
Affairs indicated that 82 percent (91 percent in manufacturing and 56 percent in
nonmanufacturing) of the agreements contained checkoff provisions." BNA LAB.
REL. ExPEDr ir § 33, at 673.
36 See William D. Gibson Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 660, 664 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
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3. The Unwarranted Advantage Factor
The potential impact of the bird-in-the-hand factor is as great when
there is an incumbent union as in the no-incumbent situation. Although the
incumbent's past bargaining performance will be a primary consideration in
the employees' selection, even a relatively unimpressive contract signed
with the incumbent after the rival asserts its claim will exert influence on
employee free choice very similar to that which a contract with a recognized
union would exert in the no-incumbent situation. Moreover, an employer
wishing the incumbent to remain as bargaining agent-particularly when
the incumbent has not been an effective employee representative-can offer
concessions at this time to stimulate employee support for the incumbent, a
potentially serious incursion into employee free choice.37 It is equally
detrimental to permit an employer to frustrate all union bargaining attempts
before the election through intransigence just short of bad faith in order
to blacken the incumbent's bargaining record.38 Thus, the substantial
potential impact on employee free choice in the incumbent situation, al-
though less significant than in the no-incumbent situation, nevertheless
warrants the temporary impairment of industrial stability imposed by the
Midwest Piping doctrine.39
But the Board has not consistently enforced the employer's obligation
of neutrality in the incumbent situation. It has held that the union can
continue to administer the existing contract throughout the sixty- to ninety-
day period 40 prior to the expiration of the contract bar 4 even though the
37 A most vivid example of this factor in operation occurred in Lenscraft Optical
Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. 836 (1960). Lenscraft Corp. and the incumbent union signed
an agreement providing for a wage raise that would become effective only if the
incumbent won the election and then would be applied retroactively to the date of
that agreement. The Board found an 8(a) (2) violation.
38 Clearly, when the employer intends its bargaining activities to influence em-
ployee attitude toward the incumbent, employee free choice is impaired. But no
satisfactory rule suggests itself to preclude only intentional employer influences upon
employee free choice; often employer bargaining actions will unintentionally exert
an undesirable influence on employee free choice. Sunbeam Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 546,
553 (1952). For example, should the employer and incumbent sign a contract with
a significant employee gain, this bird-in-the-hand would probably override all else
in employee consideration, such as the union's ineffective administration of the con-
tract. In contrast, bargaining during a recession, which rendered impossible a new
contract with any significant employee benefits, could seriously injure the incumbent
in employee opinion.
39 Cf. note 21 mtpra and accompanying text.
In order to foster uninterrupted collective bargaining at a critical time, the Board
has established "a 60-day insulated period immediately preceding and including the
expiration date of an existing contract . . . during which the parties may negotiate
and execute a new or amended agreement without the intrusion of a rival petition."
Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995, 1000 (1958). The extension in Shea
of the Midwest Piping rule to the incumbent union situation appears to vitiate this
policy once a timely petition has been filed. But since the sixty- to ninety-day period
for filing was established to effectuate the countervailing policy of employee free
choice, to permit undue influence during the following sixty days could effectively
eliminate this same employee free choice. Thus, no different rule can logically be
applied to allow the employer to continue bargaining with the incumbent during this
period.
40 Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1962).
41General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (Nov. 19, 1962), 51 L.R.R.M.
1444, 1962 CCH N.L.R.B. ff 11782. See note 62 infra and accompanying text.
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rival union has filed a timely representation petition.42 In Coolidge Corp.,43
decided just before the Board created the Gibson exception for incumbent
unions, after the rival union had filed a representation petition, the employer
and incumbent union invoked a wage-rate renegotiation clause and agreed
to a wage increase. Almost immediately thereafter an automatic renewal
clause in the underlying agreement extended the contract for another year.
The Board held that notwithstanding the real question concerning repre-
sentation raised by the rival's petition, the incumbent union was not fore-
closed from exercising its rights under the existing contract. Thus the
renewed contract with its increased wage scale was permitted to remain in
effect.
In overruling Gibson in the Shea case, the Board pointed out that,
although the employer must cease bargaining with the incumbent when a
real question of representation arises, the employer may not refuse "to
permit the incumbent union to continue administering its contract or proc-
essing grievances through its stewards." 44 This language appears to dis-
tinguish between processing grievances and administering the contract,
implying the continuing viability of Coolidge. But a more reasonable in-
terpretation of the Board's opinion is that the union "could continue ad-
ministering its contract" in terms of "processing grievances" only. If this
were the Board's purpose, its ruling would serve merely to effectuate more
completely the full three-year contract bar, instead of prematurely terminat-
ing the contract ninety to sixty days before its normal expiration date
because a petition has been filed raising a real question of representation.
In addition, this interpretation recognizes the philosophical inconsistency of
Shea and Coolidge. Had the Board intended to continue the Coolidge ex-
ception for the period preceding the contract's expiration, its overruling of
Gibson would have been senseless. To permit an incumbent union to invoke
a renegotiation and renewal clause in an existing contract sets up the
principal target of the Midwest Piping doctrine in the incumbent situation-
the unwarranted advantage factor. Since this bird-in-the-hand-the re-
newed contract with its increased wage rate-would influence employees
at least as much as would continued collective bargaining for a new contract,
an exception for the Coolidge situation would be completely illogical.
Therefore, it is fair to infer that the Board overruled Coolidge sub silentio
when it specifically overruled the Gibson exception which resulted from
the philosophy that produced Coolidge.45
4 2 Shea Chemical Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1027, 1029 (1958); Seaboard Terminal
and Refrigeration Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 754, 755 (1955) ; cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
91 N.L.R.B. 955, 961 (1950).
43 108 N.L.R.B. 3 (1954).
44 Shea Chemical Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1027, 1029 (1958).
4 5 However, see the Lenscraft Trial Examiner's use of the Coolidge case as
authority for the proposition that the incumbent union still had rights under the exist-
ing contract to negotiate "a wage increase pursuant to an appropriate reopening
clause." Lenscraft Optical Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. 836, 848 (1960).
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C. Conclusion
Unquestionably, a collective bargaining agreement between an em-
ployer and a union representing a majority of employees promotes the
primary congressional objective of industrial stability 4 6 When there is no
incumbent union, the substantial potential for impairment of employee free
choice clearly justifies a short-run curtailment of industrial stability so that
application of the Midwest Piping doctrine may achieve meaningful long-
run stability. However, in an incumbent union situation in which the
unwarranted prestige and union security clause factors are not significant,
the doctrine's applicability depends on the unwarranted advantage rationale
which reveals an incursion into employee free choice sufficiently great to
justify the rule's extension. Finally, since no court has yet challenged
the Board's application or non-application of the doctrine to the incumbent
situation, and since the Coolidge rationale has been implicitly discredited
by the Board, the Midwest Piping doctrine should be applied in both the
no-incumbent and incumbent union situations.
II. DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN BOARD AND COURTS
A. The Standard for Determining the Existence of a Real Question
1. Relevance of Employer Motive
The courts accept the basic premises of the Midwest Piping doctrine 
47
but sometimes articulate diverse substantive standards to review Board
findings under the rule. The Board requires employer neutrality whenever
one union cannot clearly demonstrate majority status. The Courts of
Appeals for the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, cognizant of the
employer's 8(a) (5) duty to bargain with a majority union,48 have en-
deavored to determine whether the recognized union in fact enjoyed
majority support. On the other hand, the Courts of Appeals for the Third
and Sixth Circuits have based their determinations on the employer's good
faith belief: the Third Circuit has asked whether the employer had knowl-
edge or reasonable grounds to believe that the incumbent no longer repre-
sented a majority of employees ;49 the Sixth Circuit has examined the rea-
sonableness of the employer's belief that the recognized union was the
majority representative." Although all of these circuits have adhered to a
46 See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
4 7 See, e.g., District 50, United Mine Workers of America v. NLRB, 234 F.2d
565, 569 (4th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. National Container Corp., 211 F.2d 525, 536
(2d Cir. 1954) ; NLRB v. North Elec. Co., 296 F.2d 137, 139 (6th Cir. 1961) (dictum).
48 Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, enforced, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
49 NLRB v. Swift & Co., 294 F.2d 285, 287 (3d Cir. 1961). The court adopted
its standard despite the fact that the employer had framed the issue on appeal as
whether "the record . . . support[ed] the board's finding that a real question of repre-
sentation existed . . . ." Id. at 286.
6o NLRB v. North Elec. Co., 296 F.2d 137, 138 (6th Cir. 1961). But see NLRB
v. Wheland Co., 271 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam) (by implication applying
appropriate test) ; NLRB v. Standard Steel Spring Co., 180 F.2d 942, 945 (6th Cir.
1950).
j963]
940 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
substantial evidence scope of review standard,51 the latter two courts have
applied an inapposite substantive test.52 Evidently allowing the employer's
8(a) (5) 53 obligation to obscure its duties under 8(a) (1) and (2), they
have failed to appreciate that employer recognition of one of two rival
unions can impair employee free choice as much when the employer acts in
good faith as when he intends discrimination. Indeed, 8(a) (1) seems
to focus on the effect of employer action rather than on employer intent.55
The Third Circuit's test is additionally defective because it appears to give
-5 See St. Louis Independent Packing Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 700, 701-02 (7th
Cir. 1961) ; NLRB v. Burke Oldsmobile, Inc., 288 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1961) ; NLRB v.
Wheland Co., 271 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam) (by implication) ; Cleaver-
Brooks Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 264 F.2d 637, 642 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
817 (1959); NLRB v. National Container Corp., 211 F.2d 525, 532 (2d Cir. 1954);
Stewart-Warner Corp. v. NLRB, 194 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1952); Standard Steel
Spring Co., 180 F.2d 942, 945 (6th Cir. 1950).
52 However, application of the good faith standard of NLRB v. North Elec. Co.,
296 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1961), and NLRB v. Swift & Co., 294 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1961),
see notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text, might induce different results regardless
of these courts' position on the reliability of informal indicia of majority support,
since they might hold that an employer who relied on this evidence to demonstrate
the representative status of one union was bound to cease recognizing the incumbent.
The same reasoning would apply in the no-incumbent situation. But cf. Pittsburgh
Valve Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 193, 196 n.10 (1955), order set aside and case remanded,
234 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1956), in which the Board found it unnecessary to consider
the General Counsel's contention that an appropriate unit was not prerequisite to a
real question of representation in a no-incumbent situation.
53 Indeed, Swift draws its standard from the Board's opinion in an 8(a) (5)
case, National Carbon Division, Union Carbide, 105 N.L.R.B. 441 (1953), which
attempted to reconcile the employer's duty of neutrality and his 8(a) (5) obligation,
294 F.2d at 287.
54 See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
55 Section 8(a) (2), on the other hand, seems to aim at intentional employer
activity, and, indeed, probably was enacted to eliminate the company dominated or
encouraged union. H.R. REi. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1935). Further-
more, although 8(2) was included in the original Wagner Act, in 1945 the Board
based the Midwest Piping doctrine solely upon 8(1). Midwest Piping & Supply Co.,
63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945). In Ensher, Alexander & Barsoom, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 1443
(1947), in which the Board created the defunct union exception to Midwest Piping
and therefore found no violation, the Trial Examiner had grounded his finding of
violation on 8(1) alone. Id. at 1451. In fact, until 1951, the Board had treated an
8(a) (2) and 8(a) (1) charge separately, dealing only with the latter under the
Midwest Piping doctrine. See Siler Mill Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1680, 1682-83 (1951).
But cf. William Penn Broadcasting Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1104, 1111 (1951) (intermediate
report) (finding rejected by Board, id. at 1105). In Stewart-Warner Corp., 94
N.L.R.B. 607 (1951), enforcement denied, 194 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1952), the Board
coupled 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (2) violations but did not specifically cite Midwest Piping.
Thus it appears that Sunbeam Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 546, 552-54 (1952), was the first
case to subsume an 8(a)(2) violation within the doctrine, although in Sunbeam,
the Board seemed to recognize a need to find a discriminatory employer motive to
sustain the 8(a) (2) violation, since it did not ground its 8(a) (2) holding on the
unlawful recognition alone. Id. at 553-54. But cf. Corning Glass Works, 100 N.L.
R.B. 444, 447 (1952), enforcement denied, 204 F.2d 422 (1st Cir. 1953). By 1954,
the General Counsel was apparently charging 8(a) (2) violations under Midwest
Piping as a matter of course, regardless of employer motive. See, e.g., William D.
Gibson Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 660, 669, 677 (1954) (intermediate report) (employer
good faith quite clear) ; Pittsburgh Valve Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 193, 198 (1955), enforce-
ment denied, 234 F.2d 565, 568-69 (4th Cir. 1956) (employer good faith quite probable).
Nevertheless, in the case under Midwest Piping in which employer good faith was
seemingly most manifest, the General Counsel failed to charge an 8(a) (2) violation.
North Elec. Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 675, 679 (1960), enforcement denied, 296 F.2d 137
(6th Cir. 1961).
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the incumbent an unwarranted presumption of continued majority support
which in itself may significantly impair the effectiveness of the employees'
indication of a desire to change their bargaining representative. The courts
should not depart from the Board's test unless they can demonstrate that
employer intent is relevant to the protection of the employees' section 7
rights.5 6
2. The Board's Apparent Four-Point Rule
Superficial comparison of Board and court opinions suggests that the
Board employs a rigid four-point rule in order to determine the existence
of a real question-a question exists when a petition has been filed, and a
Board election is not precluded by a certification bar, contract bar, or in-
appropriate unit-, whereas the courts of appeals generally examine the
entire record in order to evaluate the Board's findings. However, closer
examination reveals that the distinction is more apparent than real; in
practice the Board's test has been as flexible as the courts'.
The Board holds that a real question concerning representation exists
when two unions seeking to represent the same employees 57 in an appro-
priate unit or units 58 file with the Board representation petitions substan-
tiated by at least thirty percent employee support.59 When there is an
incumbent union, the rival's petition not only must satisfy these require-
ments,6 0 but must also be filed when an election will violate neither the
56 In NLRB v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 210 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 1954),
denying enforcement of 103 N.L.R.B. 1750 (1953), the court misunderstood the
Board's holding to be that even though one union in fact had secured majority support,
the employer's recognition violated 8(a) (1) and (2) under the Midwest Piping doc-
trine. The court noted that the Board had stated that it had adopted the findings
of the trial examiner who had found no 8(a) (2) violation, but apparently overlooked
the fact that the Board had explicitly conditioned its acceptance: "to the extent that
they [the trial examiner's findings] are consistent with the findings, conclusions, and
order hereinafter set forth." 103 N.L.R.B. at 1751. The Board had then expressly
rejected the reliability of the employee-signed petition, and found an 8(a) (2) violation
in the employer's recognition. Id. at 1752. Further confusing its decision, the court
spelled out the Board's contention that the issue of majority support was only posed,
and not settled, when the rival union presented its petition. 210 F.2d at 503. Re-
turning to its misconception that the Board had not disturbed the trial examiner's
finding of majority status, id. at 504, the court then found the Board's "position"
contradictory to 8(a) (5) and rejected it. The court concluded that the Board's
order could only be enforced if the employer had discriminated in favor of the recog-
nized union during the campaign, and, finding no unlawful intent, denied enforcement.
Id. at 504. Cf. NLRB v. Standard Steel Spring Co., 180 F.2d 942, 946 (6th Cir.
1950) (finding no bad faith during campaign).
5 7 Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1068 (1945).
58 A union cannot represent a unit that the Board deems inappropriate under the
circumstances. National Labor Relations Act § 9(b), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1958). In William Penn Broadcasting Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1104,
modified, 94 N.L.R.B. 1175 (1951), the Board held that a real question concerning
representation was not raised by a rival petition seeking to organize an inappropriate
unit, and therefore the employer was not acting in good faith. If alleged units overlap
and both are appropriate, a real question of representation exists.
59 23 NLRB ANN. REP. 14 (1958).
60 William Penn Broadcasting Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1104, 1106, modified, 94 N.L.
R.B. 1175 (1951).
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certification nor contract bar rules.6 ' Generally, a majority union that has
signed a valid collective bargaining agreement of definite duration cannot be
removed as representative for three years or the term of the contract if
shorter.62 Moreover, in Phelps Dodge Ref. Co.,63 the Board held that a real
question of representation had not been raised by a rival union petition filed
after an existing contract had been automatically renewed by failure of either
party to object. The renewed agreement erected a new contract bar requir-
ing the employer to continue to recognize the incumbent union although it
might no longer represent a majority of employees. In addition, the Board
has held that even though a majority of employees in a unit changed their
minds immediately after certification, a certified union is entitled to recog-
nition for one year; 64 therefore, no real question concerning representa-
tion can be raised during that year.6 5 No case has yet presented the oppor-
tunity for judicial review of the Board's rule 6 6 that no real question can
exist when the certification bar, contract bar, or appropriate unit rule
precludes employer recognition of one of the competing unions. But dis-
agreement here is highly unlikely; a Board election would not aid in settling
the representation issue since, regardless of election results, the employer
could not be permitted to recognize the precluded union without completely
undercutting the bases for these individual rules.
The Board has not always adhered to a strict four-point test. In
Sunbeam Corp.,67 the employer recognized one of three 68 competing
unions on the basis of a bare majority of membership cards. Since a Board
election had been conducted for that unit within the immediately preceding
year, the employer contended that no real question concerning representa-
tion could exist for one year from the date of the election, and that, accord-
ingly, its recognition did not violate the Midwest Piping rule.69 The Board
rejected this contention and pointed out that the employer could have
61 Even if the rival union were to demonstrate majority support in an election,
employer recognition during the term of the certification or contract bar would be
unlawful.
6 General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (Nov. 19, 1962), 51 L.R.R.M.
1444, 1962 CCH N.L.R.B. ff 11782.
63112 N.L.R.B. 1209 (1955).
64 Ray Brooks, 98 N.L.R.B. 976 (1952), enforced, 204 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1953),
aff'd, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
05Shea Chemical Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1027, 1029 (1958) (dictum).
66 "[T]he Midwest Piping doctrine does not apply in situations where, because
of contract bar or certification year or inappropriate unit or any other established
reason, the rival claim and petition does not raise a real representation question."
Ibid.
67 99 N.L.R.B. 546 (1952).
68 In an earlier proceeding, a fourth union, the United Electrical Workers, had
been certified within the year; the certificate had been invalidated by the Board
because of the failure of the union's officers to file non-communist affidavits. Sun-
beam Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 525 (1952). In the instant case, the Board assumed that
the UEW "had no collective bargaining rights to be respected by the Employer," and
therefore, in determining the existence of a real question, the Board did not consider
the UEW claim. 99 N.L.R.B. at 552 n.13.
69 See id. at 553.
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validly relied on "a consent election conducted by an impartial body to
determine by secret ballot the bargaining representative" 70 in order to
eliminate a real question. Thus, the Board has recognized the existence of
a real question although a representation petition had not been filed when
filing would have been pointless because no election could then have been
conducted.
71
In Pittsburgh Valve Co.,72 the Mineworkers, which was bargaining
agent in all the employer's other plants, claimed to represent a majority of
employees at a new plant. After two successive Steelworkers petitions
had been dismissed without prejudice because the unit in question had not
yet been fully expanded, 73 the employer recognized the Mineworkers union.
The Board found that the unit was not "inappropriate" but only unsettled;
thus a real question of representation remained.74 It concluded that "the
continuing existence of the claim, and not . . . only the acceptance and
processing of a petition" 75 determines the persistence of a real question, and
held unlawful the employer's recognition. Although denying enforcement,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Board on this
issue.76
Sunbeam and Pittsburgh Valve establish that neither the filing of a
rival petition nor its continuance 77 is necessarily prerequisite to the Board's
finding a real question. Further, in Burke Oldsmobile, Inc.,78 in which no
7
0 Id. at 553 (dictum). Although only dictum, this statement assumes far more
significance than a court's obiter; since the Board has been charged with administer-
ing the labor act and developing labor policy, see generally Peck, The Atrophied
Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961),
its views on a particular question have the effect of regulatory rulings and are there-
fore a good indication of the present state of the law. See also id. at 730.
71 Cf. Pittsburgh Valve Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 193, 195 (1955), enforcement denied,
234 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1956) ; note 77 infra.
72 114 N.L.R.B. 193 (1955), enforcement denied on other grounds, 234 F.2d 565
(4th Cir. 1956).
73 An expanding unit results from either imminent or current enlargement of
the working force in an otherwise appropriate unit. The temporary unsuitability
of an expanding unit is premised on the theory that since all employees will be bound
by the election result, to permit a small number of employees to determine the repre-
sentative for a much larger total unit would constitute a fundamental impairment of
employee free choice. Id. at 195.
74 The Board stated:
The effect of a dismissal under such circumstances, therefore, is to serve
notice on the parties that the selection of an exclusive representative in an
appropriate unit by the employees then employed is premature, and to leave
open for later resolution the question of what union, if any, a more repre-
sentative complement of employees desire as their statutory bargaining
representative.
Ibid.
75Ibid.; accord, NLRB v. Swift & Co., 294 F.2d 285, 287 (3d Cir. 1961).
76 District 50, United Mine Workers v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 565, 569 (2d Cir. 1956).
'77The Board expressly noted in Pittsburgh Valve that the petitions had been
dismissed "for reasons unrelated to the validity of the claim," and that repeated
petitions would have been a "useless gesture." 114 N.L.R.B. 195. Had the petitions
been dismissed on the merits, the outcome of the case quite probably would have been
different.
78128 N.L.R.B. 79 (1960), modified and enforced, 288 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1961).
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petition had been filed but the rival's claim was manifest,79 the trial ex-
aminer found that "a petition is not an indispensable prerequisite to the
existence of a question concerning representation." 80 Although the Board
did not specifically address itself to this issue, it stated that it had adopted
the conclusions of the trial examiner.8 1 Judge Learned Hand for the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit expressly agreed with the trial examiner
on this point 8 2 Moreover, the Board would certainly not maintain that
merely by satisfying the certification or contract bar and appropriate unit
criteria a union could automatically raise a real question without further
demonstrating some interest in the employees and progress toward their
organization. This has usually been supplied by the thirty percent sub-
stantiation for the petition 3
The Board apparently takes the position that the timely filing of a
representation petition precludes continued employer bargaining with the
incumbent union from the date of filing 8 4 Three courts have disagreed,
finding, in essence, that a real question could not be raised until the Board
actually ordered the election.8 5 By compelling termination of bargaining
with the incumbent when the petition is filed, the Board recognizes that
employee free choice could be significantly impaired by allowing the in-
cumbent and the employer to create a bird-in-the-hand situation during the
period between filing and the Board order for an election. Since election
procedures are ordinarily expeditious,"6 prevention of bargaining for an
additional few days detracts insignificantly from industrial stability.8 7
Thus, the principal justification for the Midwest Piping doctrine sustains
the Board's interpretation.
The Board has held that satisfaction of all four points did not establish
the existence of a real question when, pending certification, the employer
79 The rival had been the employees' bargaining representative for the preceding
two years, had secured a majority of membership cards immediately before the exist-
ing contract had expired, and had made a formal request for recognition within two
weeks of the employer's recognition of the other union. Burke Oldsmobile, Inc.,
128 N.L.R.B. 79, 86 (1960) (intermediate report), modified and enforced, 288 F.2d
14 (2d Cir. 1961).
80 Ibid.
s1 Id. at 79.
82 NLRB v. Burke Oldsmobile, Inc., 288 F.2d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1961).
83 Cf. William D. Gibson Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 660, 677 (1954) (intermediate report).
84 See North Elec. Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 675 (1960), enforcement denied, 296 F.2d
137 (6th Cir. 1961).
85 NLRB v. North Elec. Co., 296 F.2d 137, 139-40 (6th Cir. 1961); cf. NLRB
v. Swift & Co., 294 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir. 1961) ; St Louis Independent Packing
Co., 291 F.2d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 1961) (dictum).
86 See note 21 supra and accompanying text
87 In North Electric, since the old contract expired on July 1, and the Board
ordered the election on July 6, the total interruption of industrial stability was only
five days in terms of contract coverage. However, the petition was filed on April 22,
and thus the employees would lose the benefit of collective bargaining for the two
and a half months until July 6th when the bargaining would have been terminated
under the courts' rule. See 129 N.L.R.B. at 680. The delay in this case, however,
was atypical. See note 21 supra.
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recognized the winning union because the rival union had become defunct8 8
The Board thus approved the employer's recognition because reliable evi-
dence demonstrated that a real question no longer existed. The Board,
therefore, does not restrict its approach to the four factors but uses the
same substantive test applied by the courts, examining all the evidence to
determine whether a real question concerning representation existed at the
time the employer recognized one union. The fundamental source of
judicial disagreement with the Board has been the courts' willingness to
rely on certain indicia of majority support to justify employer recognitions
invalidated by the Board.8 9
B. Application of the Standard
In reviewing the record as a whole, some courts have disagreed with
Board determinations that a real question concerning representation existed.
This disparity results from the Board's rejection and the court's acceptance
of membership cards, hand votes, or employee failure to cancel dues checkoff
authorizations as reliable indicators of the absence of a real question.
1. The Reliability of Membership Cards in the Rival Union Situation
In an oft-cited footnote to Midwest Piping,90 the Board recognized
that an employee can partially relieve the mounting tension and pressure
of an organizational campaign between competing unions simply by signing
a union membership card, and that he can entirely eliminate this stress by
signing cards for both unions. The Board therefore rejects signature cards
as reliable evidence of majority status in the rival union situation because
they may not reflect an uncoerced employee choice. Consequently, an em-
ployer may not base recognition of one of two rival unions on these cards
unless special justification should exist.91 Thus, in Cleaver-Brooks Mfg.
Corp.,92 the Board determined that the designation of one union on thirty-
five of forty-seven membership cards did not alone eliminate a real question
of representation so as to justify the employer's recognition of that union.93
8 8 Ensher, Alexander & Barsoom, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 1443 (1947). Compare
National Container Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 1544 (1953), enforced, 211 F.2d 525 (2d
Cir. 1954).
s9 See note 52 supra.
90 Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1070 n.13 (1945). See
note 10 supra.
91 See note 104 infra and accompanying text.
92 120 N.L.R.B. 1135 (1958), enforcement denied, 264 F.2d 637 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959).
93 Accord, Burke Oldsmobile, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 79 (1960), modified and en-
forced, 288 F2d 14 (2d Cir. 1961); Halben Chem. Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 872 (1959),
modified and enforced, 279 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1960) ; A. 0. Smith Corp., 122 N.L.R.B.
321 (1958) ; Cleaver-Brooks Mfg. Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1135 (1958), enforcement
denied, 264 F.2d 637 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959) ; Shea Chem. Corp.,
121 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1958); The Wheland Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 814 (1958), enforcement
denied, 271 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam) ; Scherrer and Davisson Logging
Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1587 (1958); Novak Logging Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1958);
Sunbeam Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 546 (1952); Standard Steel Spring Co., 80 N.L.R.B.
19631
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On review, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to enforce
the Board's order; it held that the Board's determination that the cards
did not establish the recognized union's majority status was not supported
by substantial evidence.
94
Even when the employer or an independent party has verified the
signatures, the Board has invariably discredited membership cards and
employee petitions.95 Although the courts disagree, the Board is correct
in holding verification irrelevant, for the issue is not the validity of the
signatures but their reliability as an indication of employee preferences. In
one case in which nine employees in a purported separate unit had signed
with two unions, the Board declined to credit their second signatures which
were supported by an affidavit confirming their adherence to the second
union.9 6  The court, however, was persuaded.9 7 The Board's position
again properly takes account of the unreliability of signatures solicited
during an intense rival union campaign. An employee who has been con-
vinced to sign a membership card for a second union is unlikely to resist
additional pressure from his newly chosen union to sign an affidavit revok-
ing his previous commitment.
When a single union attempts to organize an employer, however, the
Board accepts the reliability of membership cards9 s in order to determine
under section 8(a) (5) whether the employer's refusal to recognize a union
1082 (1948), enforcement denied, 180 F.2d 942 (6th Cir. 1950) ; cf. Indianapolis News-
papers, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 1750 (1953), enforcement denied, 210 F.2d 501 (7th Cir.
1954) ; Stewart-Warner Corp., 94 N.L.R.B. 607 (1951), enforcement denied, 194 F.2d
207 (4th Cir. 1952).
94 Cleaver-Brooks Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 264 F.2d 637, 642 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959). Similarly, courts of appeals have relied on signatures
on membership cards and employee petitions to deny enforcement of Board orders
in NLRB v. Wheland Co., 271 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam); NLRB v.
Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 210 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Stewart-
Warner Corp., 194 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Standard Steel Spring Co.,
180 F.2d 942 (6th Cir. 1950). See Halben Chem. Co., 279 F2d 189, 190-91 (2d Cir.
1960), nodifying and enforcing 124 N.L.R.B. 872 (1959); cf. NLRB v. Corning Glass
Works, 204 F.2d 422, 426 (1st Cir. 1953) (dictum), denying enforcement of 100
N.L.R.B. 444 (1952) (Board order based on discriminatory assistance and ignores
card reliability issue). But see NLRB v. Burke Oldsmobile, Inc., 288 F.2d 14, 16
(2d Cir. 1961), modifying and enforcing 128 N.L.R.B. 79 (1960). See also NLRB
v. Swift & Co., 294 F.2d 285, 288 (3d Cir. 1961) (dictum), denying enforcement of
128 N.L.R.B. 732 (1960) ; District 50, United Mine Workers, 234 F.2d 565, 569 (4th
Cir. 1956), denying enforcement on other grounds of 114 N.L.R.B. 193 (1955).
05 Wheland Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1958), enforcement denied, 271 F.2d 122
(6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam) (Board held cards unreliable despite employer verifi-
cation of accuracy of signatures and random interviews with signatories) ; Indianapolis
Newspapers, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 1750, 1751 (1953), enforcement denied, 210 F.2d 501
(7th Cir. 1954) (Board found employee petition unreliable despite signature veri-
fication); Sunbeam Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 546, 548 n.4 (1952) (Board held cards un-
reliable despite signature verification by certified public accountants) ; Stewart-Warner
Corp., 94 N.L.R.B. 607, 627-28 (1951) (intermediate report), enforcement denied,
194 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1952) (Board found employee petition unreliable despite sig-
nature verification by police captain).
96 Standard Steel Spring Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1082, 1087 (1948), enforcement
denied, 180 F.2d 942 (6th Cir. 1950).
97 180 F.2d at 945-46.
98 Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953).
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was motivated by a good faith doubt as to the union's majority status.99
A union will rarely resort to an 8(a) (5) action to establish its representa-
tive status due to the relative speed with which certification can be secured
through Board election processes.' The 8(a) (5) issue is therefore
typically posed when the employer has refused to recognize a union fol-
lowing a formal demand and presentation of a majority of signature cards,
or when, after the union has petitioned for an election, the employer com-
mits unfair labor practices which the union believes have destroyed its
majority status. 01 Since the effect of the employer misconduct might never
abate sufficiently to allow the union to win even a delayed election, the
union will file an 8(a) (5) charge which requires the Board initially to
determine whether the union in fact represented a majority of employees
when the employer rejected its claim for recognition. In this context, the
Board has relied on the cards 10 2 to negate the employer's assertion of a
good faith doubt about the union's representative status, and to require the
employer to bargain with the union. 03
The Board's reliance on membership cards in the single union situation
is not inconsistent with its rejection in the rival union context because of
the difference in factual settings and Board alternatives in the two situa-
tions. Typically, the tension of a rival union campaign far exceeds that of a
single union's drive for support, and the competition forces each union to
organize as quickly as possible. The single union campaign is usually more
leisurely; consequently employee free choice is subject to less pressure and
is more likely to be reflected in the membership cards. Furthermore, since
the 8(a) (5) action almost always reaches the Board after employer unfair
practices have at least temporarily, and possibly permanently, destroyed
the union's majority support, a Board election may be an entirely unac-
ceptable method of ascertaining the employees' real preference. Therefore,
to prevent the employer from completely frustrating employee free choice,
the Board must rely on some evidence to indicate the union's majority
support at the time of its demand, for this determination is prerequisite to
the 8(a) (5) question whether the employer's refusal was motivated by a
good faith doubt as to the union's representative status. In this dilemma,
9 Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.1.B. 1263 (1949), modified and enforced, 185 F.2d
732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
100 See note 21 supra.
101 See, e.g., Wheeling Pipe Line, Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 244 (1955); Dependable
Machine Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 21 (1953); Warren Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 689, 699 (1950).
But see Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), aff'd, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962);
Brown Truck and Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953).
102 The reliability of membership cards-a crucial issue under 8(a) (5)-is almost
never litigated for pre-election refusal to recognize when the employer is charged
with no other unfair labor practices during the campaign. This is true because under
the Board's decision in Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954), a union which
proceeds to an election, instead of asserting the 8(a) (5) claim, cannot after the
election resort to 8(a) (5) except for employer conduct subsequent to the election;
and the union will almost invariably prefer the election route as explained in text
accompanying notes 100-01 supra.
103 See, e.g., Wheeling Pipe Line, Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 244, 257 (1955) ; Dependable
Machine Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 21, 25 (1953) ; Warren Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 689, 699 (1950).
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the Board must depend on the membership cards to demonstrate that the
union actually represented a majority of employees at the time it demanded
recognition. 0 4 In the rival union situation, since the Board's election
machinery remains the most reliable verification of employee preference,
and the pressure on employees is more intense, dependence on membership
cards is unnecessary and unwise.
2. The Reliability of Hand Votes
In Burke Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB,0 5 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit upheld the Board's order which adopted the trial examiner's
rejection of the reliability of certain "informal indicia" of majority sup-
port '0 6 -twenty-nine of forty-one cards and a unanimous hand vote for
one union in the employer's presence-which the employer had contended
precluded a real question of representation. 1 7 The unreliability of a hand
vote in the presence of the employer or his representatives is obvious. In
fact, the results of any open ballot are highly suspect because of the sig-
nificant possibility of "follow-the-leader" voting and the pressure on em-
ployees to avoid the consequences of antagonizing the union that appears
to be in ascendency. Thus this evidence alone' 08s should not negate the
existence of a real question concerning representation.
3. The Reliability of Employee Failure to Cancel Dues
Checkoff Authorizations
In the related cases of Swift & Co.109 and St. Louis Independent Pack-
ing Co.,"10 the employer contended that, although a rival petition had been
104 In Brown Truck and Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953), decided
by three members of the Board, no unfair labor practices were committed by the
employer prior to the filing of the 8(a) (5) charge. Two members relied on the
cards and held the employer guilty of an 8(a) (5) violation; chairman Farmer dis-
sented on the ground that the cards were not reliable. Since the lesser amount of
pressure on employee free choice in the single union situation is not independently
sufficient to make the cards reliable in this context, the majority's reliance in this
case could conceivably be explained on the ground that some undisclosed factors
indicated that the cards were reliable in this particular situation. Cf. Snow & Snow,
134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), aff'd, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962), in which the Board,
in finding an 8(a) (5) violation, relied on the cards because the employer "did not
question the accuracy or the propriety of the card check."
105288 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1961), modifying and enforcing 128 N.L.R.B. 79 (1960).
106 128 N.L.R.B. at 86.
107 Although the court's opinion stressed the unreliability of a hand vote in the
employer's presence, had it considered the signature cards reliable, it could have
denied enforcement of the Board's order solely on that basis. Its holding, therefore,
implicitly recognized the unreliability of the cards in this case. See note 108 infra.
108 In Burke Oldsmobile, had the employer not rejected an almost identical dis-
play of support from the rival union before the recognized union appeared, and had
the hand vote been conducted in less coercive circumstances, the combination of a
more reliable hand vote and the majority of signature cards might have justified the
employer's recognition.
109 128 N.L.R.B. 732 (1960), enforcement denied, 294 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1961).
.10 St. Louis Independent Packing Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 622 (1960), enforced, 291
F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1961). St. Louis Packing is a division of Swift & Co. The Board
rested its decision in St. Louis on the holding in Swift & Co. Id. at 622 n.1.
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filed and the contract with the incumbent union had expired, the failure of
most of the employees to exercise their prerogatives to cancel dues checkoff
authorizations indicated their continued support for the incumbent. The
Board disagreed, finding the employees' inaction unrepresentative of their
preference, and held unlawful the employer's negotiation of a new contract
with the incumbent after expiration of the old agreement since no other
evidence had been offered to show that no real question existed. In Swift,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied enforcement, holding
that the employer did not have a reasonable basis for believing that a real
question concerning representation existed."1 In St. Louis, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit accepted the Board's holding because an
employee might fail to cancel dues authorizations for many reasons, only
one of which was continued support of the incumbent.1 12 Furthermore, a
few extra dues payments would be insignificant to the employee compared
to the serious repercussions from open resignation from the incumbent
should it be re-elected. Thus it is unrealistic to find that an employee's
failure to cancel his authorization usually expresses his continued support
for the incumbent union; he may as likely have chosen to disavow the in-
cumbent in a less blatant manner through an election, rather than jeopardize
his standing with a union that might continue to be the only agency for
prosecuting his grievances and protecting his interests. The Board, there-
fore, has been correct in characterizing this evidence as an unreliable indica-
tion of the incumbent's continued representative status,113 although this
evidence might cumulate with other informal indicia to eliminate a real
question of representation in a particular case.
Thus, although the courts apply the test of substantial evidence on the
whole record, the same evidence may lead them to opposite conclusions
because of their willingness or unwillingness to defer to Board determina-
tions of the reliability of certain evidence in each case.114 This raises the
question of the scope of judicial review appropriate to this type of adminis-
trative determination.
C. The Proper Scope of Review on Questions of Reliability
The scope of review suited to factual questions depends on the nature
of the particular issue under scrutiny. In Universal Camera Corp. v.
ll NLRB v. Swift & Co., 294 F.2d 285, 288 (3d Cir. 1961). The court rested
its decision on the reliability of the employee inaction, despite a reluctance, expressed
in another context, to credit signature cards. Id. at 288.
112 St. Louis Independent Packing Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 700, 704-05 (7th Cir.
1961).
113 In St. Louis, for example, only 3% of the employees cancelled their dues
checkoff authorizations, yet 27% voted for the rival union in the election that followed
the Board's rejection of re-recognition of the incumbent.
114 In determining whether a real question existed, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit has not relied on employee failure to cancel dues checkoff au-
thorizations, implicitly accepting the Board's position on the dependability of these
indicia of majority status, St. Louis Independent Packing Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d
700 (7th Cir. 1961), enforcing 129 N.L.R.B. 622 (1960); however, it has relied on
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NLRB," 5 in which the factual issue was the employer's motive for dis-
charging a particular employee, the Supreme Court established the rule that
a Board finding of fact may not be reversed if supported by substantial
evidence on the whole record.116 An appellate court must frequently review
lower court determinations on issues of motive; the Board is more expert
than a trial court at extracting motive from a factual setting only to the
extent that the Board, through continuous exposure to similar situations,
has acquired a facility for drawing inferences of motive from certain facts.
Since this distinction is not apt to be substantial, however, a court of appeals
should apply to Board determinations of this type a scope of review that
more nearly approximates judicial review of lower court fact finding. But
under the language of Universal Camera, the very existence of a division
of opinion among the courts on the reliability of the informal indicia of
majority status indicates that the Board's determinations on these issues
should be sustained:
Nor does it mean that even as to matters not requiring expertise
a court may displace the Board's choice between two fairly con-
flicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made
a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.
117
In NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co.,"18 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit was called upon to review a Board decision that certain employer
speeches had a necessary tendency to affect employee votes at an election.
Judge Learned Hand concluded that "a 'lay' mind" could determine only
that the speeches might well have caused the loss of majority status-an
issue he would have had to resolve adversely to the party with the burden
of persuasion had he been reviewing a lower court finding. He recognized
that because of the Board's "specialized experience in the field of labor
relations . . . [which] enable[d] it to appraise causes and consequences
that escape the perception of those less widely acquainted with those rela-
tions," it could state authoritatively that a certain course of conduct strongly
tended to cause a given result and could provide an appropriate remedy.119
membership cards to deny enforcement of Board orders. NLRB v. Indianapolis
Newspapers, Inc., 210 F.2d 501, 503-04 (7th Cir. 1954), denying enforcement of 103
N.L.R.B. 1750 (1953); Cleaver-Brooks Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 264 F.2d 637, 642
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959), denying enforcement of 120 N.L.R.B.
1135 (1958).
115 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
116 The crux of the Universal Camera holding was that "the whole record" which
a court of appeals must consider included the intermediate report by the trial examiner.
Id. at 497.
"17 Id. at 488.
118217 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955).
"19 Id. at 905. Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
Nor [did Congress intend] . . . to negative the function of the Labor
Board as one of those agencies presumably equipped or informed by experi-
ence to deal with a specialized field of knowledge when findings within that
field carry the authority of expertness which courts do not possess and
therefore must respect
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These expert determinations, he continued, should be immune from judicial
review, or at least subject to a review of only the most limited nature. The
Supreme Court, recognizing the Board's particular "cumulative experience"
as exemplifying most clearly the distinction between the judicial and ad-
ministrative processes, has permitted the Board to decide factual ques-
tions 12 0 and fashion remedies 12 ' on the basis of evidence outside the record
of the case in question, 122 although a trial court would not be allowed to
do so.
The issue of "reliability" is more aldn to the issue of "effect" in Stow
than to the issue of "motive" in Universal Camera and should therefore be
subject to the most minimal judicial review. Because of its "cumulative
experience" in observing the disparity between these informal indicia of
majority support and the outcome of subsequent Board elections, the Board
is best able to determine the issue of reliability. Mustering its practical
knowledge to draw the proper inferences from the facts of each case, it
has decided that these indicia have been unreliable. A court, on the other
hand, is not competent to determine the credibility of this evidence since it
is restricted to the record before it 123 and has no special experience in
labor relations to qualify its inferences from that record. Evidence of
reliability admitted in any given case will seldom enable an appellate court
to evaluate accurately the relationship between the majority of membership
cards, hand votes, or failures to cancel authorizations and the actual
representative status of the union. Therefore, the courts should defer to the
Board's expert determination of the unreliability of these informal indicia.12
4
III. EFFECT OF THE MIDWEST PIPING DOCTRINE ON THE
EMPLOYER's 8(a) (5) OBLIGATION
Under section 8(a) (5),125 the employer is obligated to recognize a
majority union unless it has a good faith doubt as to the union's majority
status.12 6 Yet if the Board finds that a real question concerning representa-
tion existed when the employer recognized one union, it will hold the em-
120 In Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 800 (1945), the Supreme
Court recognized that the Board's experience with similar situations would assist its
drawing inferences from established facts.
121NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348-49 (1953).
1 Foreman & Clark, Inc. v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 396, 408 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 887 (1954), in which the court relied on Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S.
344 (1953).
' "The record discloses no reason why the authenticity of this claim of majority
status should have been subject to any doubt." NLRB v. Indianapolis Newspapers,
Inc., 210 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 1954).
1
2 4 But cf. NLRB v. Burke Oldsmobile, Inc., 288 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1961). judge
Hand, for the court, made no specific reference to Stow, in which he also wrote the
opinion; indeed, he does not appear to have considered it applicable.
125 National Labor Relations Act § 8(5), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1958).
126 Of course, if an employer knows that no real question exists, its refusal to
bargain constitutes an 8(a) (5) violation. Cf. Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263,
enforced, 185 F2d 732, 741-42 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
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ployer liable for section 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (2) violations despite the em-
ployer's genuine belief that no real question existed. Moreover, the Board's
determination that signature cards, hand votes, and employee failure to
cancel checkoff authorizations are generally unreliable indication that no
real question existed has made employer recognition of one of two com-
peting unions even more hazardous.
In National Carbon Division, Union Carbide,1 2 7 the employer had
refused to bargain with a majority union because a rival union had filed a
representation petition. Although the Board subsequently dismissed the
petition,12 8 thereby removing the possibility that any real question could
exist, it refused to find an 8(a) (5) violation. The Board reasoned that,
since an employer violates 8(a) (2) by recognizing a union when a real
question exists, it should not be held for an 8(a) (5) violation when it re-
frains from bargaining with a majority union because it guesses incorrectly
about the existence of a real question.3 0 An employer cannot be expected
consistently to discern the existence of a real question of representation
which may involve, for example, the appropriateness of a particular unit
or the timeliness of a petition. National Carbon was not appealed, and
opportunity for judicial review on this issue will probably not arise, since
it is unlikely that the General Counsel will issue 8(a) (5) charges in this
situation. The Board's analysis, in any event, is compelling as long as the
Midwest Piping doctrine retains its present force. It allows an employer
with a good faith doubt about the existence of a real question concerning
representation to withhold recognition from both unions, without risk of
violation, until the Board settles the representation issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
The apparent disparity between Board and court standards for deter-
mining the existence of a real question concerning representation arises from
the Board's failure to articulate its precise reasons for each decision of a
rival union representation question.130 The Board's custom is to state that
a real question of representation existed because the petition was properly
m 105 N.L.R.B. 441 (1953).
128 The petition was dismissed not on its merits but because of the filing of unfair
labor practice charges which were subsequently found groundless. Id. at 442 n.16.
This practice was abandoned by the Board in favor of the present procedure to
stay the election pending the outcome of the unfair practice charges. Brown & Root
Caribe, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 1817, 1819 (1959).
-2 91d. at 443. Although the Board in National Carbon expressly stated that
the petition was dismissed because of pending unfair labor practice charges, see
note 69 supra, the Board's rationale necessarily applies to a dismissal on the merits.
See North Elec. Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 675, 676 (1960), enforcement denied, 296 F.2d 137
(6th Cir. 1961) (dictum that an employer is privileged to refrain from bargaining
during the pendency of a timely petition).
130 In fact, in two significant cases in the rival union representation area, the
Board adopted the trial examiner's findings and conclusions with little or no modi-
fication. North Elec. Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 675 (1960), enforcement denied, 296 F.2d
137 (6th Cir. 1961); Burke Oldsmobile, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 79 (1960), modified and
enforced, 288 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1961). And in Shea Chem. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1027
(1958), the Board chose to articulate no reasons for overruling William D. Gibson,
Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 660 (1954).
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filed, the unit is appropriate, and no certification or contract bar precludes
an election. It fails to relate its discussion of the unreliability of mem-
bership cards to the particular factual situation, but merely cites or quotes
Midwest Piping on that issue.1 1 On review, certain courts, evidently
believing that they are renouncing a rigid four-point test,132 examine the
entire record under the Universal Camera standard and conclude that no
real question could exist when one union had secured a high percentage of
signature cards. The Board could obviate such misunderstanding by
clearly demonstrating that its holdings are based on an evaluation of the
reliability of the particular evidence in each case.133 This would invoke the
extremely narrow scope of judicial review applicable to expert administra-
tive determinations. Fully articulated Board opinions would eliminate
much of the judicial resistance to the Board's application of the Midwest
Piping doctrine.
134
Melvyn Preenan
131 The Wheland Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 814, 817, 818 (1958), enforcement denied,
271 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam) ; Scherrer and Davisson Logging Co., 119
N.L.RB. 1587, 1588 (1958); Novak Logging Co. 119 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1575 (1958);
Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 1750, 1752-53 (1953), enforcement de-
nied, 210 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954); cf. Halben Chem. Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 872, 878
n.9 (1959) (intermediate report), modified and enforced, 279 F.2d 189 (2d Cir.
1960); Cleaver-Brooks Mfg. Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1135, 1136 (1958), enforcement
denied, 264 F.2d 637 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959) (Board does not
discuss reliability of cards). But see Sunbeam Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 546, 553 (1952) ;
Standard Steel Spring Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1082, 1090 (1948) (intermediate report),
enforcement denied on other grounds, 180 F.2d 942 (6th Cir. 1950).
-3 2 See NLRB v. Swift & Co., 294 F.2d 285, 286-87 (3d Cir. 1961), in which the
court, in evaluating the Board's finding that a real question existed from the filing of
the representation petition, apparently believed that the Board's position was too rigid.
The court cited Pittsburgh Valve Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 193 (1955), enforcement denied
on other grounds, 234 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1956), for the proposition that "it is the
continuing existence of the representation claim and not the mere filing of a petition
which determines whether the doctrine should be applied." In Pittsburgh Valve,
the Board was determining whether a real question could exist although a petition
was not pending. See notes 72-76 supra and accompanying text
1 3 3 In Sunbeam Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 546, 553 (1952), the Board carefully evalu-
ated the reliability of the cards in the specific factual setting of the case. Its holding
was not appealed. Cf. Standard Steel Spring Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1082, 1090 (1948)
(intermediate report), enforcement denied on other grounds, 180 F.2d 942 (6th Cir.
1950). On the other hand, in District 50, United Mine Workers, 234 F.2d 565, 569
(4th Cir. 1956), denying enforcement of and remanding 114 N.L.R.B. 193 (1955),
the court of appeals remanded the case to the Board to determine whether the recog-
nized union represented a clear majority of employees.
134 The Board has similarly been criticized for failure to articulate rationally
the basis for its decisions in lockout cases. 111 U. PA. L. REv. 128 (1962).
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